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SECRET NOFORN The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC-03763/86 12 August 1986 Copy /___

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM:

Acting Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting

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Poland: Exploiting the "Yalta Syndrome"

- 1. The release of prominent dissidents under the latest amnesty program may ease the Polish regime's domestic and international isolation. Coming on the heels of a series of arrests and reprisals against Solidarity activists, however, the amnesty is part of a familiar cycle of repression and largesse. It is unlikely to alter the fundamental stalemate between the regime and the population at large.
- 2. These concessionary measures should in any case not obscure the Jaruzelski regime's continuing campaign to discredit the US Government in the eyes of Poles at home and abroad. Paralleling its efforts to link Solidarity with "foreign elements," especially CIA, the regime has sought to use the Kuklinski case to invoke "Yalta fears" of US duplicity. In both areas the campaign has met with some success.
 - -- We can expect further attempts to discredit the US and particularly to discover (or fabricate) "evidence" of CIA manipulation of the Polish opposition.
- 3. There has been further reaction among Polish emigre leaders to charges (initially made by Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban) that the US had foreknowledge of martial law plans but declined to alert Solidarity to the imminent danger. An article in the latest (July-August) issue of Paris Kultura returns to the Kuklinski case and repeats much of the criticism made by Mazewski and other Polish emigre leaders in the US.

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- 4. The Jaruzelski regime must have assumed that Urban's revelations about martial law preparations would marginally worsen its already weak standing among the Polish population but concluded that potential gains outweighed liabilities.
 - -- The regime evidently figured that the Polish emigration, frustrated over the deadlock on sanctions and discouraged by the state of affairs in "normalized" Poland, was ripe for exploitation through a new version of the "Yalta sellout" thesis.
 - -- Above all, however, this line is intended for domestic consumption. The allegation that the US abandoned Poles to their fate complements the regime's broader campaign to discredit Solidarity, undermine US credibility in Poland, and foster apolitical resignation among the Polish people.

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